Neil Smith
In The Long Twentieth Century, Giovanni Arrighi makes a convincing case that the period since But I want to argue that this "crisis of transition" since the 1970s has been marked not simply by a geographical reshuffling of who occupies the core of the global capitalist system, or even by the rising of some national capitals at the expense of others. Rather, the entire geographical framework of capital accumulation is being transformed.
In particular there is a restructuring of the geographical scales that organize and are organized by the production, circulation and reproduction of surplus value. This in turn constructs a whole new pattern of uneven geographical development in the global economy that affects local as much as global structures of social and economic production and reproduction.
I have previously proposed a theory of uneven geographical development under capitalism, but underpinning remains valid, I would argue, but the production of geographical scale, from the local to the global, consonant with globalization, indicates a much greater flexibility than previously imagined in the forms that capital accumulation can take. In particular, although the different geographical scales constructed as a framework of accumulation were conceived as mutable and not permanent, the apparent dispensibility of the nation state, as economic actor, however selective, marks a crucial evolution of global capitalism.
I will begin with a discussion of globalization, the ideology as much as the reality, and then move to a discussion of geographical scale. The third section will address the question of uneven development today in the light of globalization and new patterns of the production of scale.
I Globalization?
In the rhetoric about globalization, the crucial question is: what exactly is being globalized. And as a corollary to this question, what is being ideologically veneered by the term "globalization"? In the first place, there is an important distinction between internationalization and globalization. But second, it is too simple to argue that "capital" is being globalized. If global markets in commodity and finance capital were in place for the postwar expansion, the same cannot be so readily claimed about production capital, labor and cultural capital. The rise of multinational capital and the widespread international traffic in raw materials notwithstanding, it was not until the 1970s that production per se began to transcend the national boundaries that had previously bounded production systems and regimes into specific regions. On the one hand, the scale of competitive manufacturing in many sectors of the economy simply outgrew the national markets. Thus as Kevin Cox has argued "what is held to be the result of hypermobility of capital other, component parts were more readily and more cheaply available from outside the pre-existing industrial regions. The "world car" of the early 1980s which, however dubiously, came to symbolize this shift to global production, actually stemmed from both scale and price 2) Smith, N., Uneven development: capital, nature, and the production space, Basil Blackwell, 1984, 198pp. The Restructuring of Spatial Scale and the New Global Geography of Uneven Development (Smith) 53
considerations. To the extent that it succeeded, "modernization" in the so-called Third World was precisely about seeding national economies, whether via growth pole politics or import substitution, or (more recently) via niche production for the global market. That the majority of commodities are still produced in local economies does not negate the acceleration of clearly globalized production. The period since the late 1970th has witnessed an unparalleled global movement of labor, the wages of which are also a part of production capital. There have of course been numerous international migrations in the past, but there is no comparable period in which such labor fluidity touches the cultural economies of six continents. Far from coincidental, these labor movements contribute to economic globalization as new mixes of cheap or specialized labor facilitate expanded production in specific places, but they also just as clearly result from the social disruption brought about by that expansion. If the unprecedented mobility of labor lends credence to claims of a certain cultural globalization, it is important to remember too that the globalization of cultural capital is also tightly enmeshed with expanded communications technologies and therefore with
Equally important are the connections between the economic and cultural dimensions of globalization on the one side and the neo-liberal politics of structural adjustment, privatization and deregulation on the other. Centred on the nation-state, a certain geographical congruence between economic and political activities characterized the development of capitalism from the eighteenth century through the postwar era. Globalization inaugurates the systematic recession of this geographical congruence as more and more capitals of a smaller and smaller size find it possible to "jump" the national boundaries that defined state territories. Indeed they find themselves required to jump scales for sake of competitive survival, and as a result national governments became less and less willing to regulate capital, for fear of capital flight. Here again economic and social globalization feed each other: the national governments of Europe and North America, under severe pressure from emerging as well as existing economic competitors by the late 1970s were less and less dependent on a home-grown, low-wage and reserve labor force that was most dependent on welfare and social services. The welfare states that had been erected earlier in the century, precisely as a means of both securing a labor force and preventing its revolt, could now be The social chaos in much of the underdeveloped world is real but Kaplan's new environmental determinism propping up a righteous global survivalism is a cause not a solution. It has to be remembered that the most deadly war of the twentieth century involved primarily European "tribalism", at a cost of some 30 to 45 million lives; that a single US act of "primitivism" in
Hiroshima killed an estimated 135,000 people (and that the US Congress succeeded in preventing even a public discussion of this genocide, via the Smithsonian Institution, in its fiftieth anniversary year): that the unprecedented ecocide in the Iraq desert was made in America; that the holocaust of Rwanda did not match the scale of Nazi genocide against Jews and communists, gays and travelling people; and that Slobodan Milosevic has re-performed genocide as ethnic cleansing under the banner of Serbian nationalism at century's end.
In this context, it makes sense to think of the recent history of sub-Saharan Africa in somewhat different terms. In fact, sub-Saharan Africa since decolonization has been treated to a crash-course in the most vicious aspects of free-market capitalism while being largely denied any of the benefits.
For what is remarkable about the last two decades in this region is its virtual systematic expulsion from capitalism, the ideology of modernization notwithstanding. Thus in the early to mid-1980s, when "Third World debt" led the list of economic crises in the "Western" press, the utter silence concerning sub-Saharan debt revealed loudly that this region was too poor even to have the luxury By contrast, the World Bank and IMF have found since the early 1980s that they could bribe nearly 20% of the world's national economies to undergo "structural adjustment" programs of debt curtailment and market privatization. This led to any number of "IMF riots", as they came to be called, following an uprising in Kingston, Jamaica, aimed directly at the IMR austerity program15).
But it also led to worse. Since at least 1978, the World Bank has consistently funded multimillion dollar "development" projects in Rwanda, over the objections of anthropologists and others who warned explicitly that the projects established a patronage system for the dominant Hutus while As the language of globalization itself suggests, much of the current restructuring involves a dramatic remaking of geographical scale. The most straightforward implication of this rhetoric is that an economy previously organized into different national units was now global. The scale question is of course much more complicated than this. The global scale was already well in place before the 1980s having crystalized throughout the century as the scale of capital circulation and the market. The national scale, a project of more than two centuries and many bourgeoisies, was largely in place by the beginning of the century but was completed with the decolonization of Asia through the work of major European American urban theorists of the last third of the century20) The Keynesian city was in many respects the welfare hall for each national capital, combining the functions of social support and the reproduction of a national labor market. Indeed the so-called urban crisis of the late 1960s and 1970s was widely interpreted as a crisis of social reproduction, having to do with the dysfunctionality of racism and patriarchy and the contradiction, between an urban form elicited according to strict criteria of profitability yet one that had to justified in terms of the efficiency and efficacy of social reproduction. But by the 1970s the idea of separate "national economies" was obsolete. International linkages per se were not new, of course, but the level of economic integration across national boundaries was, and with commercial and financial capital largely globalized already, it remained only for production capital also to "jump scales". This was the real basis for the "discovery" of globalization by the late 1980s, a process that was dramatically fueled if not caused by the generalization of computer technology, the comparative cheapening of air transportation, and the parallel cheapening of most raw materials.
The erosion of the national scale, at least in economic terms, is having a direct and rapid impact on cities, and to understand how and why it is necessary to identify the different dimensions of the weakened national scale. First and most obviously, enhanced communications and deregulation have increased capital mobility and dramatically expanded the range of capitals that are free to move where lower costs of social reproduction in turn lower the costs of production. Second, -60-formation of economic crises-the argument is increasingly transposed in the twenty first century city. The production of metropolitan space still potentially constrains the law of value except that it is more and more the environmentally inspired deterrence of production rather than social reproduction that will press against the law of value. Some of the constraint may be similartraffic jams and exorbitant rents-but with highly decentralized, interlinked production nodes nestled all around a metropolitan area rather than concentrated in industrial zones, the effects of these constraints are transformed. More broadly, the much acclaimed. Postindustrial city increasingly appears as a quixotically narrow vision in time and space. Given the present trajectory it will not take long for the opinion setters with access to the media to begin to ask how on earth we ever came to believe such a transparently self-serving fiction, and to begin to reveal the worlds of urban work that such ideologies erased.
This restructuring of scale and the rise of the "metropolitan world" represents just one thread of the new urbanism of the twenty first century. It dovetails with the more culturally attuned assessment of political geographer Peter Taylor who argues that "cities are replacing states in the construction of social identities25)" Cities like Sao Paulo and Shanghai, Lagos and Bombay, are likely to challenge the more traditional urban centers, not just in size -they have already done thatbut, primarily as leading incubators in the global economy, progenitors of new urban form, process and identity. They are already cities in which the journey to work has become excessive for many people without obviously challenging the law of value. Thus just as the intense research and policy focus on cities in the 1960s and 1970s quickly gave way to a preoccupation with regional change in recognition of the new industrial regionalism of the late twentieth century economy, this regional worldview is now itself outdated and will give way in the twenty first century to a metropolitan cum planetary outlook, local cum global. Significant signs of this are already apparent. Rare was the city in 1975 that had its own trade missions but a quarter century later it is the rare city that does not. And in New York the fin de siecle mayor, Rudy Giuliani, piqued at the mounting parking chaos combined with diplomatic immunity resulting from the presence in his city of the United Nations, and just as piqued at the US government's refusal to tackle the problem, threatened only half in jest that New York City would begin adopting its own foreign policy. No-one seriously argues that the twenty first century will see a return to a world of city-states but it will see a recapture of urban political prerogative vis-a-vis nation states.
III The New Geography of Uneven Development
The long twentieth century was the century of uneven development, spurred on by the unprecedented accumulation and mobility of capital, it became so just as surely via certain strategic fixations of capital, in specific scales matched to specific functions in the global landscape. The question of contemporary uneven development has so far been posed here in rather dichotomous terms: equalization vis-a-vis differentiation; powerful globalized control centers of the world with the geographies of powerlessness and expulsion. This vision is real enough as far as it goes. I stress it here because I think that for more than a decade, the search for a politics of global affairs, at least in the Euro-American left has focused on cultural, discursive and social fault lines of "difference" at "the first multicultural uprising in recent American history27)." he resolution of th e central dialectic of uneven development-the joust between processes of equalization and differentiation-is thereby rendered even more intensely geographical: as a symptom of globalization, geoeconomic turf wars emerge at everything from the global to the local scale.
In the period from the 1880s to the end of World War I a fundamental transition took place in the global production of space. Contrary to Rosa Luxemburg's (and Marx's) expectations, the conjuncture of economic and geographical expansion, which had characterized European-centered global capitalism, was dismantled. Figures as diverse as Vladimir Lenin and Cecil Rhodes, and the geographers Isaiah Bowman, Halford Mackinder and Alexander Supan, all understood in different ways that with the world completely divided between discrete "modern" nation-states (and their colonies), economic expansion ceased to be tied so directly to territory. Absolute economic expansion would henceforth involve relative geographical expansion of one place vis-a-vis another-the constant division and redivision of the world-rather than an absolute geographical expansion.
From this period onward, the unevenness of capitalist development was driven less by the difference between capitalist economies and the "backward" (that is, pre-capitalist) societies that lay outside the global market, than by the unevenness inherent in the logics o f capital accumulation.
Against the backdrop of this distinct economic geography of the twentieth century, how are we to conceive of the still incomplete transition the apparent stability of postwar Fordism? In the first place, it has to be remembered that the US-led globalism of the middle of the century was always incomplete. The Russian revolution, the Stalinist regimes of eastern Europe following 1945, and the Chinese revolution severely circumscribed (but did not entirely cut off) access by capital to these places and populations. With all of these economies now scrambling for access to the global market, the current restructuring is taking place under an expanded set of geoeconomic conditions. The significant industrialization of many economies in Asia and Latin America, the entry of China into the global market after 1979, and the aggressive attempts to capitalize the Soviet and East European economies since 1989 do not fundamentally alter the central dialectic of uneven development so much as take it to its limit. The dilemma of labor power vis-a-vis capital is represented afresh: the flow of capital to economic spaces of least resistance where initially low labor costs lubricated partial integration of the NICs into the central circuits of the global economy has in turn created reciprocal pressure to increase wages in those same economies, either from workers' demands and organization (for instance, in South Korea or Brazil) or from further competition from never, even lower-wage NICs building niches in the global market. Thus since the mid 1980s, these earliest NICs have themselves been undercut and are no longer the choicest locations when cheap labour is the primary consideration. Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea now increasingly lose out to the intense competition from lower wage Asian neighbors such as Malaysia and Thailand, and at the same time they exploit these economies for ancillary production in electronics, textiles and other industrial sectors. Now, however, unlike earlier periods of expansion, Slobodan Milosevic chose to harness nationalist reaction against a similar fate. Others will follow.
As Rosa Luxemburg's example suggests, there are no geographical limits to capitalist expansion.
Or at least, any such planetary limits are very far from being confronted and will be rendered moot by extra-planetary economic expansion, already well underway thanks to NASA. Rather, it is the internal geography of capitalist unevenness that makes economic stability so vulnerable. In the organized and disorganized political assaults against nation states that have exploited and repressed their citizens-states which now find themselves suddenly vulnerable-it is vital that we remember the flexibility of the new global geography of uneven development and that the limits on simply national assaults on power are kept clearly in mind.
